I examine whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows provide or garble information. Consistent with theories that predict more informed trading when public information is less informative, I find that bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading are higher both when earnings are smoother than cash flows and also when earnings are more volatile than cash flows. Additional tests suggest that managers' discretionary choices that lead to smoother or more volatile earnings than cash flows garble information, on average. However, I find that informed trading is attenuated in settings in which theory suggests that discretionary smoothing or volatizing of earnings is likely to be informative.
Introduction
In this paper I investigate whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows provide or garble information for market 810 S. JAYARAMAN participants. It is well understood that accounting rules such as the required matching of expenses and revenues are designed to smooth out fluctuations in cash flows and present a smooth stream of earnings (e.g., Dechow [1994] ). Other accounting conventions, such as conservatism, and the inherent difficulty in predicting future cash flows can result in earnings that are more volatile than cash flows (e.g., Basu [1997] , Dechow and Dichev [2002] ). On the other hand, it is possible that earnings that are smoother than cash flows result from managers' proactive discretionary choices, such as income smoothing (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003] , Levitt [1998] , Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] , Arya, Glover, and Sunder [2003] ), while earnings that are more volatile than cash flows may result from discretionary choices such as "big baths" and timely loss recognition (e.g., Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] , Givoly and Hayn [2000] , Ball and Shivakumar [2006] , Turner [2001] , Riedl [2004] ). Thus, earnings that are either smoother or more volatile than cash flows may be due to either the neutral application of accounting rules and conventions or proactive discretionary choices, or both. Regardless of the underlying reason for smoother or more volatile earnings, an empirical question arises whether these outcomes either provide or garble information.
I refer to the difference between the volatility of earnings and the volatility of cash flows as the accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV ). Using bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading as proxies for informed trading, I find that when earnings are smoother than cash flows (i.e., for negative values of the accrual component), there is, on average, more informed trading. Similarly, when earnings are more volatile than cash flows (i.e., for positive values of the accrual component), there is, on average, more informed trading. These results suggest that earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows garble information and thus attract informed traders. Because earnings volatility can differ from cash flow volatility either because of accounting conventions or due to proactive period-by-period managerial discretion, I perform additional tests to parse out the individual effects of neutral application and proactive discretion.
To establish my hypotheses, I rely on theories from information economics that link the informativeness of public information to informed trading (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] , Verrecchia [1982] , Diamond [1985] , , Baiman and Verrecchia [1996] ). These theories predict that the informational advantage of informed traders, and therefore the level of informed trading, is inversely related to the informativeness of public disclosure.
1 Following prior research in market microstructure, I 811 use bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading as proxies for the level of informed trading. According to the above theories, if earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows provide information, then these reporting outcomes are associated with lower bid-ask spreads and lower probabilities of informed trading. On the other hand, if earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows garble information, then these reporting outcomes are associated with higher bid-ask spreads and higher probabilities of informed trading. 2 Alternatively, it is possible that these reporting outcomes are unrelated to informed trading. 3 Volatility of earnings is defined in this paper as the variance of five years' earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by assets, and the volatility of cash flows is defined as the variance of five years' annual cash flow from operations, scaled by assets. I use the difference between these two volatility measures, which is the accrual component or ACEV , to classify earnings as to whether they are smoother or more volatile than cash flows. Negative (positive) values of the accrual component indicate earnings that are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. 4 The empirical results indicate that higher levels of informed trading are associated with more negative values of the accrual component (i.e., earnings processors to produce superior assessments of a firm's performance on the basis of an earnings announcement provides them with a comparative information advantage over market makers" (Kim and Verrecchia [1994, p. 44 
]).
2 It is possible that earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows provide information but are associated with more informed trading because public and private information are complements. Lundholm [1998] and Manzano [1999] consider correlated public and private signals, while Indjejikian [1991] considers correlated private signals. Alles and Lundholm [1993] present a general representation of the asset payoff and information structures and derive predictions based on modifications to the underlying structures. Substitutability versus complementarity of public and private signals also depends on whether the private signal is about the asset payoff or the public signal (Verrecchia [2001] ). Although I perform additional tests to investigate the possibility of complementarity, I cannot conclusively rule out this interpretation.
3 Prior studies have generally used associations with contemporaneous or future stock prices/returns (value relevance) to assess informativeness of reporting outcomes. While contemporaneous association-based studies might be intuitively appealing, they face the problem of correlated omitted variables, because these studies do not account directly for the mechanism through which information is impounded in stock prices. That is, do earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows provide information and directly impound information into stock prices, or do they garble information and thus attract informed traders who impound the private information into stock prices through informed trading? A related limitation of future stock price/returns-based associations is that they do not address the reasons that the ability of current earnings to predict future stock prices/returns is not arbitraged away. Informed trading, on the other hand, is based on the informativeness of public information and does not rely on associations with future realizations. 4 The characterization of earnings that are either smoother or more volatile than cash flows as the difference between earnings volatility and cash flow volatility (i.e., the second moment) is in the spirit of prior studies that characterize accruals as the difference between earnings and cash flows (i.e., the first moment). In subsequent sections, I discuss the robustness of my results to alternate measures currently used in the literature.
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S. JAYARAMAN smoother than cash flows). Further, higher informed trading is also associated with more positive values of the accrual component (i.e., earnings more volatile than cash flows). Informed trading is the lowest when the accrual component is close to zero (i.e., earnings volatility similar to cash flow volatility). The relation between the accrual component and informed trading is robust in a multivariate regression that includes controls for firm size, turnover, illiquidity, and the inverse of stock price.
Having established the overall relation between informed trading and the accrual component of earnings volatility, I next examine the role of proactive discretion in the relation between informed trading and the accrual component. Studies in the accounting literature allow for the possibility that proactive discretion in the reporting process is aimed at either providing or garbling information. In a recent survey of more than 400 corporate executives, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005] find that an overwhelming majority of CFOs (97%) prefer to report smooth earnings, holding cash flows constant. The main reasons offered by survey participants for their preference for smooth earnings are the perception of lower risk, the lower cost of equity and debt, and improved earnings predictability by analysts. Prior research has not reached a consensus on whether income smoothing either provides or garbles information for equity market participants. While some researchers (e.g., Arya, Glover, and Sunder [2003] , Sankar and Subramanyam [2001] , Demski [1998] ) argue that income smoothing is informative, other studies, regulators, and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003] , Levitt [1998] , Lang, Raedy, and Yetman [2003] , Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker [2003] , LaFond, Lang, and AshbaughSkaife [2007] , and Barth, Landsman, and Lang [2006] ) suggest that income smoothing is an act of earnings management that garbles information.
There is also no consensus in the literature on whether proactive discretionary choices that make earnings more volatile than cash flows reveal or garble information. While some researchers argue that big baths and timely loss recognition can be informative (Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] , Basu [1997] , Givoly and Hayn [2000] , Ball and Shivakumar [2006] ), other studies and regulators contend that such reporting choices reflect opportunistic behavior and can distort the information in earnings (Turner [2001] , Riedl [2004] ).
I perform three tests to examine the role of proactive discretion in the relation between informed trading and the accrual component. First, I control for the effect of neutral application by including industry fixed effects to capture constant accounting rules and by incorporating additional controls such as leverage, market-to-book ratio, firm age, institutional ownership, analyst following, and cash flow volatility. As prior research (e.g., Dechow and Dichev [2002] ) shows that the accrual component is more likely to occur due to neutral application in firms with high cash flow volatility, I also include an interaction term of the accrual component with cash flow volatility. I find that the relation between the (stand-alone) accrual component and informed trading persists, consistent with the argument that proactive discretion contributes, on average, to the garbling of information and an increase in the level of informed trading.
Second, I use standard discretionary accrual models (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995] ) to decompose the accrual component of earnings volatility into nondiscretionary and discretionary components. I find that the discretionary component is associated with higher informed trading. In contrast, the nondiscretionary component is generally insignificant.
Third, I examine a situation in which theory suggests that proactive discretionary choices are likely to be informative. Exploiting the analysis of Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] , in which big baths taken during periods of extremely poor performance and income smoothing during periods of extremely good performance perfectly reveal underlying cash flows, I investigate the relation between the accrual component and informed trading during periods of extreme performance. Consistent with their theory, I find that the relation between the magnitude of the accrual component and informed trading is attenuated during these periods, suggesting that proactive discretion does not always garble information and may in fact be informative when performance is extremely good or bad.
Because some theories argue that characteristics of the reporting environment and private information markets evolve endogenously as part of an overall equilibrium and are expected to be stable, I conduct additional tests to determine whether realization of the accrual component in every period affects informed trading. Results show that the most recent accrual component is positively associated with the following year's informed trading after contemporaneous (i.e., this year's) informed trading is controlled for. This suggests that realizations of the accrual component in a given year can affect the level of informed trading in future years.
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Two additional tests explore how changes in the accrual component affect changes in bid-ask spreads. I compute changes from small magnitudes to more negative values of the accrual component (smoother earnings) and to more positive values of the accrual component (more volatile earnings) and examine the relation between these changes and (1) future annual bid-ask spreads and (2) earnings announcement (short-window) bid-ask spreads with controls for contemporaneous bid-ask spreads. Results indicate that changes in the accrual component from small magnitudes to more negative values and to more positive values are associated with higher incremental future annual spreads. In the case of the short-window test, changes from small magnitudes to more positive values are associated with larger incremental announcement spreads, whereas the relation between changes from small magnitudes to more negative values is insignificantly associated with incremental announcement spreads. On balance, these results suggest that the increase in informed trading for these firms occurs subsequent to the earnings announcement period. I also find that when the accrual component does not change, there is no change in bid-ask spreads.
While the higher level of informed trading is consistent with a greater informational advantage for all informed traders, there is one group that deserves special attention-insiders. Insiders are a subset of the group of informed traders who are endowed with private information due to their strategic association with the firm. In order to assess whether the relation between the accrual component and informed trading is driven by insider trading, I include the level of insider sales and purchases as an additional explanatory variable. Results show that the higher level of informed trading is due to informed traders external to the firm and not merely insiders.
6
This paper provides three contributions to the earnings informativeness literature. First, it uses theories from information economics to investigate whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows either provide or garble information. Second, by examining the relation between informed trading and managerial discretion, it provides evidence regarding whether reporting choices such as income smoothing and big baths are informative or whether they garble information. Finally, this study also contributes to the market microstructure literature by elucidating the mechanism through which reporting outcomes impound information into stock prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypothesis development, followed by the research design in section 3. In section 4, I describe the primary results, and in section 5, I report the results of tests exploring the individual effects of proactive managerial discretion and the influence of accounting rules. Section 6 investigates a number of extensions and robustness tests, and section 7 concludes.
Hypothesis Development
Theories of endogenous information acquisition hold that the incentives to acquire private information are inversely related to the informativeness of public information (Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] , Verrecchia [1982] , Diamond [1985] ). Further, theories argue that incentives to exploit existing private information are also inversely related to the informativeness of public information (Baiman and Verrecchia [1996] , ). The relation between informed trading and earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows depends on the extent to which the reporting outcomes either provide or garble information. 
EARNINGS THAT ARE SMOOTHER THAN CASH FLOWS
The preference of financial markets for smooth earnings is evident from a recent survey of corporate executives by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005] , who find that approximately 97% of respondents prefer to report smooth earnings, holding cash flows constant. The results of this study are suggestive, but they do not directly address the empirical question of how investors interpret smoother earnings.
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Prior academic research has not reached a theoretical or empirical consensus on whether earnings that are smoother than cash flows provide or, rather, garble information. For example, Arya, Glover, and Sunder [2003] argue that by smoothing earnings, managers remove the transient portion of earnings and communicate the permanent portion, thereby enabling equity markets to arrive at an efficient estimate of the firm's stock price. Chaney and Lewis [1995] argue that income smoothing plays an informational role, as it is high-valued, rather than low-valued, firms that smooth income. In Sankar and Subramanyam [2001] , a risk-averse manager smoothes reported earnings to smooth his consumption, revealing his private information about future earnings in doing so. A similar idea is developed in Demski [1998] , who suggests that a hardworking manager is able to better predict future earnings, which enables her to smooth reported earnings. On the other hand, other studies find that choices such as income smoothing are acts of earnings management that garble information. For example, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003] find that managers in economies with more private benefits of control use income smoothing to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Other studies find that firms that cross-list in better investorprotection regimes or adopt international accounting standards indulge in less income smoothing (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman [2003] , Barth, Landsman, and Lang [2006] ).
EARNINGS THAT ARE MORE VOLATILE THAN CASH FLOWS
There is also no consensus in the literature regarding whether earnings that are more volatile than cash flows either provide or garble information. These reporting outcomes could be due to neutral application of accounting rules and conventions such as conservatism (Basu [1997] ) and the inherent difficulty of predicting future cash flows (Dechow and Dichev [2002] ) or to proactive discretion such as big baths (Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] ), timely loss recognition (Givoly and Hayn [2000] , Ball and Shivakumar [2006] ), and choices that entail increasing and then reversing earnings without a corresponding change in cash flows. While some studies argue 816 S. JAYARAMAN that earnings that are more volatile than cash flows reveal private information (Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] , Basu [1997] , Givoly and Hayn [2000] , Ball and Shivakumar [2006] ), other studies find that these more volatile earnings do not reveal private information, but rather reflect opportunistic behavior (Turner [2001] , Riedl [2004] ).
HYPOTHESIS
If earnings that are smoother than cash flows provide information, they will be associated with less informed trading, because private information is publicly revealed. Similarly, if earnings that are more volatile than cash flows provide information, they will also be associated with less informed trading. Thus, in this case, I expect an inverted-U-shaped relation to obtain between earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows and informed trading.
On the other hand, if earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows garble information, they will be associated with more informed trading. In such a case, I expect a U-shaped relation to obtain between earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows and informed trading. My two-sided hypothesis, therefore, is as follows:
H1a: There is an inverted-U-shaped relation between earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows and informed trading.
H1b: There is a U-shaped relation between earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows and informed trading.
Research Design

ACCRUAL COMPONENT OF EARNINGS VOLATILITY (ACEV)
To measure the degree to which earnings are smoother or more volatile than cash flows, I use the difference between earnings volatility and cash flow volatility. I begin with the standard definition of earnings:
where E i,t is earnings for firm i in year t, CF i,t is cash flows for firm i in year t, and AC i,t is accruals for firm i in year t. The variance of earnings is given by
I define the accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV ) as
Replacing in equation (1),
ACEV captures the difference between earnings volatility and cash flow volatility. This characterization (i.e., the second moment) is in the spirit of prior studies that represent accruals as the difference between earnings and cash flows (i.e., the first moment).
The advantage of ACEV is that it captures the combined effect of the cash flow-accrual covariance (Cov(CF,AC)) and the variance of accruals (Var(AC)) to represent a comprehensive measure of income smoothing (Gu [2005] also makes a similar argument). It is clear from equation (1) that neither Cov(CF,AC) nor Var(AC) in isolation can determine whether earnings are smoother or more volatile than cash flows. In additional tests reported in section 6.3, I illustrate how the use of existing proxies of income smoothing such as the ratio of earnings volatility to cash flow volatility might lead to problematic inferences.
The variance of five years' annual earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by assets (EARNINGS VOL) is the proxy for earnings volatility, or Var(E). The proxy for the volatility of cash flows, Var(CF ), is the variance of five years' operating cash flows, scaled by assets (CFO VOL).
8 Equation (3) shows that when ACEV = 0, earnings volatility equals cash flow volatility (i.e., Var(E) = Var(CF ). When ACEV < 0, earnings are smoother than cash flows. When ACEV > 0, earnings are more volatile than cash flows. These scenarios are depicted in figure 1 .
The SMOOTH regime comprises earnings that are smoother than cash flows. The VOLATILE regime comprises earnings that are more volatile than cash flows. The horizontal line (ACEV = 0) represents the instances in which earnings volatility equals cash flow volatility. 
PROXIES FOR INFORMED TRADING
The proxies I use to measure informed trading are the bid-ask spread (SPREAD) and the probability of informed trading (PIN ).
3.2.1. Bid-Ask Spread (SPREAD) . The relation between the extent of informed trading and bid-ask spreads was first discussed in Bagehot [1971] . Bagehot [1971] argues that market makers trade with two kinds of tradersinformed and uninformed. While the market maker loses to informed traders, he recoups these losses from uninformed traders by increasing the bid-ask spread. Thus, a high level of informed trading leads to higher bid-ask spreads. Bagehot's [1971] intuition was subsequently modeled by Copeland and Galai [1983] , Kyle [1985] , and Glosten and Milgrom [1985] .
There are many measures of bid-ask spreads commonly used in the literature. However, Hasbrouck [2005] finds a high degree of correlation (above 0.9) among these alternate measures. Since Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)-based measures are available for a large sample of firms and over a long time period, I use them for my primary results. However, my results are robust to the alternate bid-ask spread measure of Hasbrouck [2005] . Following Amihud and Mendelson [1986] , I define SPREAD as the annual relative bid-ask spread using daily closing bids and asks. 9 Specifically,
where D i,t is the number of days in year t for firm i for which closing daily bids (BID i ) and closing daily asks (ASK i ) are available.
Probability of Informed Trading (PIN)
. Easley and O'Hara [1992] , Easley et al. [1996] , and Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara [1997] use a marketmicrostructure framework to construct a measure of the probability of informed trading (PIN ) using trade data. The underlying parameters-the arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders and the probability of an information event-determine the likelihood that the market maker transacts with an informed investor. The higher the ratio of informed to uninformed investors, the higher the PIN . Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara [2002] and argue that PIN captures information risk (the market maker's probability of trading with an informed trader) and depends on the mix of public versus private information. I use the probability of informed trading as a second proxy for the level of informed trading. PIN is more comprehensive than the extent of insider trading, because it incorporates trading by all kinds of informed traders, both insiders endowed with private information and private-information arbitrageurs who acquire private information at a cost. Because theories state that anyone 819 who has expended resources and gathered private information (or who is endowed with private information due to his/her association with the firm) is an informed trader, the definition of an informed trader is not necessarily restricted to either large institutions or information intermediaries.
SAMPLE
As bid-ask spreads are available for a large number of firms and for a longer time period than PIN , I employ two distinct samples in the study, the SPREAD sample and the PIN sample. 10 The SPREAD sample is obtained from the combined CRSP and Compustat tapes and consists of 69,218 firmyear observations from 10,245 firms in the nonregulated and nonfinancial services industries for the period 1988-2005. The year 1988 was selected as the first year for the sample because cash flow variables are available beginning only in 1987.
11 The PIN sample is obtained from Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara [2002] 12 and comprises 18,625 firm-year observations for 2,817 firms for the period 1988-2001. 14 In appendix A I present a timeline for the measurement of the variables.
The primary variables are ACEV , SPREAD, and PIN . The mean ACEV is 0.01, while the median is −0.0001. Computing ACEV based on standard deviations (instead of variances) and imposing similar restrictions on the data as in Gu [2005] yields a median ACEV of −0.005, which compares closely with Gu's [2005] median value of −0.007 (not tabulated). The mean (median) SPREAD is 4% (2%), which is similar to that reported in prior 10 Results are robust to a common sample containing both SPREAD and PIN data. 11 Although ACEV is based on the variance of five annual observations, those based on two observations or more (equivalent to earnings changes) are retained. None of my inferences is altered when the sample is restricted to ACEV based on five historical observations. 12 Available at http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/. 13 The last year for the PIN sample is 2001 because of the difficulty of estimating the parameters of the estimation model when trading intensity is very high. See Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara [2004, n. 5, p. 7] .
14 The PIN parameters in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara [2002] are estimated using the calendar year. I use the calendar year for SPREAD to maintain consistency across the informed trading proxies. Although December year-end firms comprise the majority of my sample (about 60%), I perform some sensitivity checks to ensure the robustness of my results. In Section 6.1, I use bid-ask spreads around earnings announcement dates and find consistent results. My results for both SPREAD and PIN are also robust to a sample of December year-end firms.
S. JAYARAMAN T A B L E 1 Descriptive Statistics
ACEV represents the accrual component of earnings volatility, defined as the difference between the variance of earnings and the variance of cash flows. Earnings is defined as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data item 18), scaled by assets (data item 6), while cash flow represents cash flow from operations (data item 308) scaled by assets. SPREAD is the relative bid-ask spread (defined as the closing ask minus the closing bid divided by the average of the closing ask and bid). PIN stands for the probability of informed trading. SIZE denotes the market value of equity (data item 199 multiplied by data item 25) in $ millions. TURN is annual turnover, defined as the ratio of shares traded divided by shares outstanding (data item 25). AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC INV is the inverse of the stock price. LEV is the amount of total debt (data item 9 plus data item 34) scaled by total assets. MB stands for the market-to-book ratio, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets (data item 199 times data item 25 plus data item 6 less data item 60) divided by the book value of assets (data item 6). AGE is the number of years the firm is listed on Compustat. To provide better intuitions about ACEV , I identify accounting items that cause a mismatch between earnings before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations, thereby possibly leading to large absolute values of ACEV (in the extreme SMOOTH and VOLATILE deciles). In appendix B, I present a characterization of the accounting items underlying ACEV in the most SMOOTH and in the most VOLATILE deciles. I find that ACEV in the most SMOOTH decile is associated with periods of capital expenditures (14% of the time), increases in accounts receivable (14%), changes in accounts payable (11%), and increases in inventory (10%). ACEV in the most VOLATILE decile is associated with capital expenditures (16% of the time), changes in accounts payable (15%), increases in accounts receivable (8%), increases in other special items (8%), profit/loss on sale of property, plant, and equipment (7%), and decreases in accounts receivable accompanied by a special item (7%). The values of ACEV in both of these extreme deciles are associated with periods of growth, as evidenced by capital expenditures and changes in accounts payable. However, increases in accounts receivable are more common among the most SMOOTH firms (14%) than among the most VOLATILE firms (8%). Increases in inventory are also more common for companies in the most SMOOTH decile (10%), compared to those in the most VOLATILE decile (4%). Finally, decreases in accounts receivable accompanied by a special item (7%) are more prevalent among firms with more volatile earnings than among those with smoother earnings (1%). In appendix C, I provide a one-year and five-year transition matrix of ACEV .
Empirical Results
PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
Results indicate a U-shaped relation between earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows and informed trading ( fig. 3, panel A) . Earnings that are smoother than cash flows appear to be associated with larger bid-ask spreads. SPREAD is the lowest at the center of the distribution, where ACEV is close to zero (i.e., where earnings volatility is equal to cash flow volatility). 16 As earnings become more volatile than cash flows, SPREAD increases. Thus, earnings that are more volatile than cash flows also appear to be associated with larger bid-ask spreads. A similar pattern obtains for PIN ( fig. 3, panel B ).
CORRELATIONS
Correlations between ACEV and SPREAD and between ACEV and PIN are statistically significant (table 2) . 17 There is a negative and significant correlation between SPREAD and ACEV (-0.18) and also between PIN and ACEV (-0.20) and ACEV (0.14) for firms in the VOLATILE regime. The accrual component of earnings volatility thus appears to be significantly associated with informed trading in both of these regimes, consistent with the U-shaped relation between ACEV and informed trading.
As correlations do not control for differences in innate characteristics between firms and over time, they should be interpreted cautiously.
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Correlations ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. SPREAD is the relative bid-ask spread. PIN is the probability of informed trading. Nevertheless, an association between SPREAD and ACEV and between PIN and ACEV in univariate correlations suggests a first-order relation between informed trading and the accrual component of earnings volatility.
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS
In this section, I discuss variables related to SPREAD and PIN used in prior literature and incorporate them in a multivariate regression to ascertain whether the explanatory power of ACEV with respect to SPREAD and PIN is incremental to that of these firm-level characteristics.
4.3.1. Firm-Level Determinants. Following prior research, I include market value of equity (SIZE i,t ), because larger firms have less information asymmetry (Atiase [1985] , Bamber [1987] ).
18 I also include proxies for the inventory component of spreads so that the cross-sectional variation in spreads that remains can be interpreted as capturing the adverse selection component (Glosten and Harris [1988] ). I use turnover, TURN i,t , as the proxy for liquidity. I include the Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity, AMIHUD i,t , defined as daily unsigned movements in stock returns divided by dollar trading volume. AMIHUD is a price impact measure and is highly related to the inventory component (Amihud [2002] , Hasbrouck [2005] ). 19 Finally, I include the inverse of the stock price, PRC INV , in the regression, as firms with lower stock prices have larger bid-ask spreads (Stoll [2000] ).
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Following Petersen [2005] , I estimate the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with year indicators and standard errors clustered at the firm level (table 3, panel A). The year indicators control for common shocks, which could cause cross-sectional correlation in the errors. The firm-level clustering of standard errors corrects for the possibility of serial correlation attributable to unobserved firm effects that cause serial correlation in the errors, as well as for serial correlation potentially arising from the fact that ACEV is based on five annual observations, with each earnings observation influencing both the current and future ACEV . I also use robust regressions 18 Defining SIZE as the book value of assets yields similar results. 19 As trading volume is measured differently between the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ, in unreported robustness tests I split both TURN and AMIHUD into two variables-one for the NYSE/AMEX and the other for NASDAQ (following Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam [1998] )-and find similar results.
20 I do not include stock return volatility as an additional control because the AMIHUD measure already contains the volatility of stock returns in the numerator. Although both AMIHUD and stock return volatility are highly correlated, I use the AMIHUD measure, as it explains a greater proportion of spreads than does stock return volatility. Further, I do not include the number of trades as an additional control in the main specification because it is available only on the TAQ database, which would drastically reduce the sample size. However, in unreported robustness tests I include the number of trades for this smaller TAQ-based sample and find similar results.
S. JAYARAMAN T A B L E 3 Multivariate Regression of SPREAD on ACEV
The dependent variable is the bid-ask spread (SPREAD). ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC INV is the inverse of the stock price. The regressions include year indicators and robust standard errors clustered by firm in the OLS regression. Although the relation between SPREAD and ACEV is based on a two-sided hypothesis, the negative (positive) prediction for ACEV in the SMOOTH (VOLATILE) regime is based on the preliminary evidence in figure 3, 
21 A robust regression uses iteratively reweighted least squares and assigns higher weights to better-behaved observations. See Baker and Hall [2004] for a description of robust regressions and their use.
In the SMOOTH regime (table 3, panel A), the coefficient of ACEV is negative (−0.21) and significant (t-statistic = -8.20). More negative values of ACEV are associated with larger spreads, suggesting that earnings that are smoother than cash flows are associated with more informed trading. A one-standard-deviation (0.01) decrease in ACEV is associated with a 21-basis-point increase in bid-ask spreads. In the VOLATILE regime, there is a positive (0.04) and significant (t-statistic = 7.62) relation between SPREAD and ACEV , suggesting that earnings that are more volatile than cash flows are associated with larger bid-ask spreads. A one-standard-deviation (0.07) increase in ACEV is associated with a 28-basis-point increase in bid-ask spreads.
The relations between SPREAD and ACEV in the SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes are robust to outliers (table 3, panel B). The coefficients of ACEV are -0.08 and 0.02 and significant (t-statistics = −15.76 and 9.16) in the robust regression for the SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes, respectively. The control variables have been scaled for exposition (SIZE by 10 6 ; AMIHUD by 10 4 ; MB, AGE, ANALYSTS, and TURN by 10 2 ; and INST by 10 1 ) and are in the direction consistent with prior research. SPREAD is larger for smaller firms, less-liquid firms, and firms with lower stock prices.
I also conduct OLS and robust regressions of PIN on ACEV and controls (table 4, panels A and B). Consistent with the intuition from the SPREAD results, there is a negative and significant relation between PIN and ACEV in the SMOOTH regime. The coefficients of ACEV are −1.05 and −1.14 and the associated t-statistics are −7.15 and −16.10 in the OLS and robust regressions, respectively. 22 These results indicate that earnings that are smoother than cash flows are associated with higher probabilities of informed trading. A positive relation similarly obtains between PIN and ACEV in the VOLATILE regime. The coefficients of ACEV in the OLS and robust regressions (0.11 and 0.13, t-statistic = 3.48 and 5.84, respectively) indicate that earnings that are more volatile than cash flows are associated with higher probabilities of informed trading. Results of the multivariate regressions confirm that the explanatory power of ACEV with respect to informed trading is incremental to the underlying economic characteristics of the firm.
Proactive Discretion versus Neutral Application of Accounting Rules
Having established the overall relation between earnings that are either smoother or more volatile than cash flows and informed trading, I now investigate the roles of proactive managerial discretion versus neutral or conventional application of accounting rules in the relation between ACEV and informed trading. To disentangle these individual effects, I perform three 828 S. JAYARAMAN
T A B L E 4 Multivariate Regression of PIN on ACEV
The dependent variable is the probability of informed trading (PIN ). ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC INV is the inverse of the stock price. The regressions include year indicators and robust standard errors clustered by firm in the OLS regression. Although the relation between PIN and ACEV is based on a twosided hypothesis, the negative (positive) prediction for ACEV in the SMOOTH (VOLATILE) regime is based on the preliminary evidence in figure 3, tests. First, I attempt to control for the influence of accounting rules and evaluate whether the relation between ACEV and informed trading persists, thus providing evidence of either a dominant or incremental role for proactive discretion. Second, I use the discretionary accrual model of Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995] to decompose ACEV into nondiscretionary and discretionary components. I then examine the relation between informed trading and the individual components. Third, I examine a situation in which managerial reporting discretion is hypothesized to be informative and test whether the overall relation between ACEV and informed trading is attenuated, strengthened, or of no incremental importance.
CONTROLLING FOR THE INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTING RULES
I include additional controls in the regressions to capture the influence of longstanding accounting rules and choices on the relation between ACEV and informed trading.
23 My modified two-sided hypothesis is as follows:
H2a: When the influence of accounting rules is controlled for, managerial discretion is associated with less informed trading.
H2b: When the influence of accounting rules is controlled for, managerial discretion is associated with more informed trading.
I include industry fixed effects using two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to capture constant accounting rules, and I incorporate additional firm factors to capture the interaction between accounting rules and the underlying economic characteristics of the firm. These factors capture differences in managers' accounting choices and/or differences in underlying risk/uncertainty in the operating environment. I include leverage (LEV i,t ), as it influences managers' preferences for alternative accounting standards (Holthausen and Leftwich [1983] , Watts and Zimmerman [1990] ) and managers' incentives to take on risky projects (Jensen and Meckling [1976] ).
As prior research (Dechow and Dichev [2002] , Francis et al. [2004] ) finds that the quality of accruals depends on the uncertainty of the firm's operating environment, I use firm age (AGE i,t ), defined as the number of years the firm is listed on Compustat, the market-to-book ratio (MB i,t ), and reported cash flow volatility (CFO VOL i,t ) to capture the uncertainty of the operating environment. I hypothesize that the presence of analysts and institutional investors is likely to reduce the flexibility of managers to choose accounting methods to manipulate earnings. Thus, I include analyst following (ANALYSTS i,t ), defined as the number of analysts following the firm, obtained from I/B/E/S, and institutional holding (INST i,t ), defined as the percentage of the firm's shares held by institutions based on data from the 13-F filings, as additional controls. 24 Prior studies argue that accruals naturally smooth out fluctuations in cash flows and present a smooth stream of earnings (see, e.g., Dechow [1994] ). Thus, earnings that are smoother than cash flows are expected to arise naturally (i.e., due to accounting rules) in firms with high cash flow volatility. 23 This is not to suggest that accounting rules and choices are completely exogenous and can never be changed, but that they are costly and/or hard to change from period to period. In this I follow the views of Francis et al. [2004, p. 985] on "innate" factors, who state ". . . (innate factors) capture the notion that they are predetermined with respect to each period's reporting and implementation decisions. We do not characterize them as exogenous because they can be changed, albeit slowly and at perhaps considerable cost by management . . . Our identification of these factors as innate is merely intended to capture the fact that these variables are difficult to change in the short-run." See also footnote 27. 24 It is possible that analyst following and institutional ownership in fact capture the ability of managers to exercise discretion in the reporting process. In this case, including these variables as controls biases against finding an association between ACEV and informed trading. I estimate all the regressions excluding analyst following and institutional ownership (together as well as sequentially) and find similar results.
Further, studies show that difficulty in estimating future cash flows in highly volatile environments leads to greater estimation errors in accruals (Dechow and Dichev [2002] ). One consequence of greater estimation errors is that earnings become more volatile than cash flows due to the reversing nature of accruals. As larger values of ACEV are more likely to occur due to accounting rules in firms with high cash flow volatility, I interact ACEV with CFO VOL (ACEV * CFO VOL) and include this interaction term as an additional control. The stand-alone coefficient of ACEV can now be interpreted as the role of managerial discretion. The extended regression specification is
Results of the relation between ACEV and SPREAD (PIN ) with controls for the influence of accounting rules are presented in table 5, panel A (panel B).
In the SMOOTH regime, the stand-alone coefficients of ACEV are negative (−0.45 and −0.16) and significant (t-statistic = −8.60 and −13.54, respectively) for the SPREAD sample in both the OLS and robust regressions. The coefficients of ACEV in the PIN sample are also negative (−1.19 and −1.32) and significant (t-statistic = −4.02 and −7.37, respectively) in both regressions. Similarly, ACEV is positive and significant in the regressions for both the SPREAD and the PIN samples in the VOLATILE regime. Because ACEV is related to informed trading in the presence of controls for accounting rules, I interpret these results as evidence that proactive discretionary reporting choices, on average, contribute to rather than mitigate the overall relation between ACEV and informed trading, consistent with H2b. This evidence is consistent with cross-country studies like those of Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker [2003] and LaFond, Lang, and Ashbaugh-Skaife [2007] . 25 25 Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker [2003] and LaFond, Lang, and Ashbaugh-Skaife [2007] find that income smoothing is associated with lower liquidity in the equity market. LaFond, Lang, and Ashbaugh-Skaife [2007] decompose income smoothing into nondiscretionary and discretionary components and find that the discretionary component lowers liquidity. This paper finds evidence consistent with this in a single-country (i.e., the United States) setting, where economy-wide and institutional variables are held constant. Moreover, in subsequent tests, I explore specific situations in which theory predicts that managerial discretion is informative. Results indicate that the relation between informed trading and income smoothing is attenuated in these settings. Thus, this paper also provides evidence that there are situations where managers use discretion in the reporting process to provide information to market participants.
T A B L E 5
Proactive Discretion versus Neutral Application of Accounting Rules
The dependent variable is SPREAD, the bid-ask spread. ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC INV is the inverse of the stock price. LEV is the amount of leverage, scaled by total assets. MB stands for the market-to-book ratio. 
AGE is the number of years the firm is listed on
t-Stat.
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Coeff. 
Intercept
t-Stat.
Coeff. I now examine whether the relation between informed trading and the accrual component is pronounced or attenuated by the discretionary component of accruals. The percentage of smoothest-decile firms that narrowly beat analyst forecasts is higher (14%) than the corresponding percentage in the most VOLATILE decile (7%) (see appendix B). This result, in conjunction with studies such as that of Abarbanell and Lehavy [2003] , who find that firms use discretionary accruals to increase the incidence of small positive forecast errors, suggests a role for managerial discretion.
Intercept
Following previous studies in the earnings management literature (e.g., Jones [1991] , Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995] ), I decompose ACEV into two components, nondiscretionary (ACEV NDA) and discretionary (ACEV DA), and examine the relation between informed trading and these individual components. I first decompose earnings into cash flows, nondiscretionary accruals, and discretionary accruals.
where E i,t is earnings for firm i in year t; CF i,t is cash flows for firm i in year t; NDA i,t is nondiscretionary accruals for firm i in year t; and DA i,t is discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. The variance of earnings is given by the following equation:
I define the nondiscretionary accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV NDA) as
and the discretionary accrual component of earnings volatility (ACEV DA) as
Replacing in equation (8),
As the nondiscretionary and discretionary components can each either provide or garble information, the relations between informed trading and ACEV NDA and ACEV DA are empirical questions. In the SPREAD sample, ACEV DA is negative (−0.46 and −0.16) and significant (t-statistics = −6.54 and −9.70, respectively) in both the OLS and robust regressions in the SMOOTH regime (table 6, panel A). Further, it is positive (0.04 and 0.01)
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Decomposing ACEV into Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Components
The dependent variable is SPREAD, the bid-ask spread. ACEV NDA (ACEV DA) is the nondiscretionary (discretionary) 
t-Stat.
Intercept
t-Stat.
Coeff. − and significant (t-statistic = 4.68 and 6.09, respectively) in both regressions in the VOLATILE regime. ACEV DA is significant in both regimes and for both regressions in the PIN sample (table 6, panel B). Overall, ACEV DA appears to garble information and is associated with more informed trading. ACEV NDA is generally insignificant. This is not surprising, as the regression includes firm-level factors that also capture the influence of the neutral application of accounting rules. 27
Intercept
SITUATIONS IN WHICH MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IS INFORMATIVE
I next exploit the analysis in Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] to investigate settings in which theory suggests that managerial discretion plays a role and, in particular, is informative. Specifically, I explore the relation between ACEV and informed trading during periods of extreme performance. According to Kirschenheiter and Melumad [2002] , investors infer the precision of reported earnings and managers take a big bath when the firm experiences a sufficiently negative outcome, while managers smooth income when the firm experiences a positive (or a less negative) outcome. Kirschenheiter and Melumad's [2002] model predicts a pooling equilibrium for periods of moderate performance and a separating equilibrium for big baths (income smoothing) during periods of extremely bad (good) performance. Thus, big baths (i.e., ACEV in the VOLATILE regime) during extremely bad performance and income smoothing (i.e., ACEV in the SMOOTH regime) during extremely good performance are both expected to reveal information about underlying cash flows.
I measure firm performance using the current year's annual stock returns (RET ). I denote extreme performance by setting the indicator variable EX-TREME to one for firms in the SMOOTH regime with returns in the tenth decile (extremely good performance). Similarly, I set EXTREME to one for firms in the VOLATILE regime with returns in the first decile to denote extremely bad performance (inferences based on quartiles are similar but slightly weaker in statistical significance). To capture the impact of extreme performance on the relation between ACEV and informed trading, I interact ACEV with EXTREME and define this term as ACEV * EXTREME. As income smoothing and big baths are expected to be informative during periods of extremely good and poor performance, respectively, I expect the relation between ACEV and SPREAD (and ACEV and PIN ) to be attenuated during these periods; that is, I expect ACEV * EXTREME to be positive (negative) in the SMOOTH (VOLATILE) regime. 27 In their examination of the relation between cost of equity and earnings attributes, Francis et al. [2004, p. 991] find that inclusion of "innate controls" in the multivariate regression renders book-to-market ratio insignificant and also reduces the economic and statistical significance of beta. My results are consistent with the notion that the nondiscretionary component (or "innate factors") and firm-level controls such as leverage, market-to-book ratio, etc., capture (in part) the same underlying constructs.
As predicted, in the SMOOTH regime, the coefficients of ACEV * EXTREME are positive and significant (0.21 and 0.10, t-statistic = 4.52 and 8.89, respectively) in the SPREAD sample in the OLS and robust regressions (table 7, panel A). The coefficient of ACEV * EXTREME is positive and insignificant in the OLS regression but positive and significant in the robust regression for the PIN sample (table 7, panel B) . This indicates that income smoothing during periods of extremely good performance is associated with relatively less informed trading. In the VOLATILE regime, the coefficient of ACEV * EXTREME is insignificant in the OLS regression but negative and significant in the robust regression (−0.01, t-statistic = −2.20). Further, the coefficient of ACEV * EXTREME in the VOLATILE regime is negative and significant in both the OLS and robust regressions in the PIN sample. This indicates that earnings that are more volatile than cash flows during extremely poor performance are associated with less informed trading. These results suggest that the relation between informed trading and the accrual component is attenuated in situations in which managerial discretion is expected to be informative. Thus, while the overall relation between ACEV associated with proactive discretion and informed trading suggests that earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows tend, on average, to garble information, it appears that proactive discretion can, in certain contexts, be informative.
Extensions and Robustness Tests
EFFECT OF REALIZATION OF ACEV ON INFORMED TRADING
Some theories argue that characteristics of the information environment and private information markets evolve endogenously and remain stable in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, one would not expect realization of the accrual component to have any effect on informed trading. However, it is an empirical question whether the realization of ACEV in a given period alters the level of informed trading. I conduct two tests relevant to this question.
First, I examine whether the accrual component is associated with next year's informed trading after controlling for this year's level of informed trading. If the accrual component has no relation to future informed trading incremental to contemporaneous informed trading (measured as of the same period as the most recent ACEV ), this suggests that new realizations of the accrual component have very little effect on the level of informed trading in any given year. I find that, after controlling for SPREAD and PIN as of year t, ACEV as of year t is significantly associated with SPREAD and PIN as of year t+1 (table 8, panel A). The OLS coefficient of ACEV in the SMOOTH (VOLATILE) regime is −0.08 (0.03) and the t-statistic is −5.19 (6.78).
Second, I examine whether changes in ACEV are related to changes in bid-ask spreads. I do not expect a monotonic relation between changes in ACEV and short-window spreads. This is because an increase in ACEV
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Situations in Which Managerial Discretion Is Informative
The dependent variable is SPREAD, the bid-ask spread. ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. EXTREME is an indicator variable set to one for firms with a current-year annual stock return in the tenth (first) decile of the annual stock return distribution in the SMOOTH (VOLATILE) regime. ACEV * EXTREME is the interaction of ACEV with EXTREME. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud 
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The dependent variable is the probability of informed trading (PIN ). ACEV is the accrual component of earnings volatility. SMOOTH (VOLATILE) is the regime in which earnings are smoother (more volatile) than cash flows. EXTREME is an indicator variable set to one for firms with a current-year annual stock return in the tenth (first) decile of the annual stock return distribution in the SMOOTH (VOLATILE) regime. ACEV * EXTREME is the interaction of ACEV with EXTREME. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] 
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Effect of Realization of ACEV on Informed Trading
The dependent variable is the bid-ask spread (SPREAD 
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Coeff. can be associated with smaller or larger spreads depending on whether it makes earnings less smooth or more volatile than cash flows. I partition the sample into quintiles of ACEV , where quintile 1 denotes the most negative ACEV and quintile 5 denotes the most positive ACEV . I compute changes in ACEV between quintiles 3 and 2 (change in earnings smoother than cash flows), between quintiles 3 and 4 (change in earnings more volatile than cash flows) as well as between quintile 3 and quintile 3 (no change). 28 I then explore the relation between changes in ACEV and (1) future annual bidask spreads and (2) earnings announcement bid-ask spreads, with controls for contemporaneous bid-ask spreads.
t-Stat
29
Results show that changes in ACEV from small magnitudes to more negative values (ACEV CHNG is −0.95, t-statistic = −1.66) and from small magnitudes to more positive values (coefficient is 0.84, t-statistic = 1.68) are associated with changes in future annual bid-ask spreads (table 8, panel B). I also find that changes in ACEV from small magnitudes to more positive values are associated with changes in earnings announcement spreads (coefficient is 0.70, t-statistic = 1.78). The relation between changes in ACEV from small values to more negative values is negative but insignificant for short-window bid-ask spreads. Finally, in unreported tests, I find that when ACEV does not change, there is no change in bid-ask spreads. The above results are significant only at the 10% level. It is not clear whether the lower significance is due to the weakness in the relation, to the nature of the test, or to the substantial reduction in power because of the reduced sample size (about 2,000 observations, compared to approximately 30,000 observations for the main tests).
ROLE OF INSIDERS
While the hypotheses are based on the behavior of all informed traders, I explore in unreported tests whether the relation between the accrual component and informed trading is driven by insider trading (as suggested in Baiman and Verrecchia [1996] ). I include the level of insider trading (defined as the total of insider sales and purchases) as an explanatory variable.
28 I exclude observations in the extreme quintiles for two reasons. First, there are very few observations that move from quintile 3 to the extreme quintiles. Second, observations in the extremes might have a differential relation with informed trading, as seen in the prior section. However, including these observations does not alter the inferences. 29 There are certain caveats. First, the accrual component is based on five annual earnings observations, and so the notion of an earnings expectation and an earnings realization, and hence the appropriateness of an event-study, is unclear. Second, it is not clear that the announcement/10-K filing period is the only time when informed traders acquire and/or trade on their private information. Further, there is ambiguity about the announcement period. As studies state that cash flow information is publicly available only after the 10-K is filed, I define the short window from the date of the release of the earnings announcement until five days after the date of the filing of the 10-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Based on a random sample of 100 firm-year observations, the average difference between the earnings announcement date and the filing date is 35 days. Hence, the short window for the entire sample is taken as 40 days. Defining the end date as three days after the filing date yields similar results. I find that higher levels of informed trading are due to informed traders external to the firms as well as to insiders. For example, in the SMOOTH regime, the coefficient of ACEV in the PIN regression declines from 1.05 to 1.03 with controls for insider trading (the coefficient for insider trading is 0.01, t-statistic = 5.29).
6.3 EXISTING PROXIES FOR INCOME SMOOTHING I also explore the relation between informed trading and an existing proxy for income smoothing-the ratio of earnings volatility to cash flow volatility (RATIO). In unreported tests, I find a positive relation between informed trading and RATIO; that is, firms with smaller values of RATIO have less informed trading. This might lead one to inadvertently conclude that income smoothing is associated with less informed trading for two important reasons.
First, RATIO is generally interpreted in the literature as a proxy for the extent of income smoothing, wherein smaller values of RATIO indicate more income smoothing and larger values indicate less income smoothing. However, prior studies do not take into account that larger values of RATIO might indicate choices such as big baths, which do not necessarily reflect a lesser degree of income smoothing. ACEV , on the other hand, distinguishes between the two regimes in which negative values of ACEV denote earnings that are smoother than cash flows and positive values of ACEV indicate earnings that are more volatile than cash flows.
Second, RATIO mathematically represents ACEV divided by cash flow volatility (CFO VOL). Low values of RATIO can arise due to either low values of ACEV (holding CFO VOL constant) or high values of CFO VOL (holding ACEV constant). Thus, the relation between RATIO and informed trading combines the relations between ACEV and informed trading and between CFO VOL and informed trading. Results presented in figure 3 indicate that lower values of ACEV are associated with less informed trading. Further, prior studies as well as results from my own (unreported) tests show that firms with higher cash flow volatility have more informed trading (Kyle [1985] , , Copeland and Galai [1983] ). Thus, the relation between RATIO and informed trading is potentially confounded by the positive relations between ACEV and informed trading (in the numerator) and between CFO VOL and informed trading (in the denominator). Studies that are interested in examining earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows are therefore better served by the use of ACEV rather than RATIO. Hasbrouck [2005] develops a Gibbs estimate of bid-ask spreads based on Roll [1984] . I find that my results are insensitive to this measure. The coefficients of ACEV are significant in the SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes for the OLS and robust regressions.
ALTERNATE MEASURE OF BID-ASK SPREAD
ADDRESSING THE POSSIBILITY OF SERIAL CORRELATION
Although the standard errors are clustered by firm, I employ a crosssectional regression to ensure that my results are unaffected by serial correlation. The cross-sectional regression uses the firm-level mean of each variable across all years in the sample and contains only one observation per firm. The coefficients of ACEV are significant in the SPREAD and PIN samples, in the SMOOTH and VOLATILE regimes, and for the OLS and robust regressions.
OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS
The main results are robust to the use of standard deviations instead of variances to compute ACEV , the calculation of variances based on ten observations instead of five, the definition of earnings as operating income or net income, the use of effective spreads, the computation of ACEV for the pre-1987 period using the balance sheet, the estimation of ACEV as the residual of a regression of earnings volatility on cash flow volatility, and the inclusion of the level of accruals as an additional control.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether earnings that are smoother or more volatile than cash flows-and, specifically, reporting choices such as income smoothing and big baths-provide or garble information. Consistent with theories that predict more informed trading when public information is less informative, I find that the difference between earnings and cash flow volatility is associated with a larger bid-ask spread and a higher probability of informed trading. More informed trading occurs when earnings are smoother than cash flows as well as when earnings are more volatile than cash flows. Further, I find evidence consistent with this in a changes specification, where changes in earnings that are smoother than cash flows and in earnings that are more volatile than cash flows are significantly associated with changes in informed trading.
I also explore the extent to which the relation between the accrual component and informed trading is due to individual effects of proactive managerial discretion and/or application of conventional accounting rules. I find that the above-mentioned relations with informed trading persist when additional controls intended to capture the influence of accounting rules are included. Further, when the accrual component is decomposed into nondiscretionary and discretionary components, I find that the discretionary component is associated with more informed trading. This suggests that managers' exercise of proactive discretion in the form of income smoothing and big baths contributes on average to the garbling of information and reinforces the relation between the accrual component and informed trading. However, in a setting in which theory suggests that managerial discretion is informative (i.e., extreme performance), the relation 845 between the accrual component and informed trading is attenuated. This suggests that proactive discretion can be informative in certain contexts.
APPENDIX A
Timeline of Variable Definitions
ACEV denotes the accrual component of earnings volatility. EARNINGS VOL measures the variance of five years' annual earnings before extraordinary items, scaled by assets. CFO VOL is the variance of cash flow from operations over five years, scaled by assets. SIZE denotes the market value of equity. TURN is annual turnover. AMIHUD is the Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. PRC INV is the inverse of the stock price. LEV is the amount of leverage. MB stands for the market-to-book ratio. AGE is the number of years the firm is listed on Compustat. INST is the percentage of institutional ownership. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts covering the firm. SPREAD is the relative bid-ask spread. PIN stands for the probability of informed trading. See table 1 for detailed definitions of the variables.
APPENDIX B
Accounting Items Associated with ACEV in the Most SMOOTH and Most VOLATILE Deciles
To provide better intuitions about ACEV , I identify accounting items that cause a mismatch between earnings before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations, thereby possibly leading to large absolute values of ACEV (in the extreme SMOOTH and VOLATILE deciles). One example of a mismatch is profit/loss on sale of property, plant, and equipment, which affects earnings before extraordinary items but does not affect cash flow from operations.
In categorizing the accounting items associated with ACEV in the most SMOOTH and most VOLATILE deciles, I make the following assumptions.
(1) Items that affect the balance sheet (income statement) and represent more than 10% (5%) of the total assets are considered. (2) "Capex" refers to capital expenditures incurred during the year. (3) Profit or loss on the sale of property, plant, and equipment is classified as "Profit/loss on sale of PPE." (4) Income from discontinued operations and extraordinary income are classified under "Discontinued operations." (5) Unrealized income or losses from unconsolidated subsidiaries are reported as "Noncash share of subsidiary." (6) Changes in accounts receivables (AR) and changes in inventory are classified into increases, decreases, and decreases with an accompanying charge to special items. The rationale is that if accounts receivable or inventory reductions are accompanied by a charge to special items, they might indicate write-offs. The category "Narrowly beat analyst forecast" includes instances in which the firm beats the median analyst forecast by less than one cent. Although meeting or missing analyst forecasts would not by itself lead to larger absolute values of ACEV , this category captures incentives to smooth earnings or to take earnings baths.
In panels A and B below, I present the frequency of the above items for the most SMOOTH and the most VOLATILE deciles, respectively. Earnings that are smoother than cash flows are associated with the following: periods of capital expenditures (14% of the time); increases in accounts receivable (14%), presumably due to increases in sales; periods of beating the median analyst forecast by less than one cent (14%); changes in accounts payable (11%); and increases in inventory (10%). Accrual components that make earnings more volatile than cash flows are associated with capital expenditures (16% of the time); changes in accounts payable (15%); increases in accounts receivable (8%); increases in other special items (8%); profit/loss on sale of property, plant and equipment (7%); decreases in accounts receivable accompanied by a special item (7%); and beating analyst forecasts (7% of the time). The values of ACEV in both the deciles are associated with periods of growth, as evidenced by capital expenditures and changes in accounts payable. However, increases in accounts receivable are more common among firms with earnings that are smoother than cash flows (14%) than among firms with earnings that are more volatile than cash flows (8%). Increases in inventory are also more common for the most SMOOTH decile (10%) compared to the most VOLATILE decile (4%). The percentage of firms that smooth earnings and narrowly beat analyst forecasts is higher (14%) than the percentage that make earnings more volatile than cash flows and narrowly beat analyst forecasts (7%). Finally, decreases in accounts receivable accompanied by a special item (7%) are more prevalent among firms with more volatile earnings than among those with smoother earnings (1%). In panel A, I report the quintiles that ACEV moves to in the following year, while in panel B, I present the quintiles that ACEV moves to after five years. Sixty percent of the observations in the extreme ACEV quintiles remain in that quintile one year later (panel A). Firms with persistently smoother earnings do differ from those with more volatile earnings. However, the percentage of observations in the most VOLATILE quintile that drop out of the sample (22%) is larger than in the most SMOOTH quintile (13%). There is a high level of attrition in the sample (panel B): Almost half of the sample drops out over five years. The percentage of dropouts is higher for the most VOLATILE quintile (72%) than for all the other quintiles. Firms with persistently smooth earnings (13%) are more frequent than those having more volatile earnings (10%).
